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thus raised are hardly found in Berkeley. His exposition of Spiritual Realism adds little to our resources for meeting them" (p. 72). "Spiritual Existence and Omnipotence do not carry us far, unless the spiritual Reality is morally perfect. Berkeley does not help us much at this critical stage" (p. 83). Professor Fraser, in short, takes up the ultimate metaphysical question at the point where Berkeley left it. The Berkeleyan philosophy itself is used simply as a point of departure; it is developed in the first chapter, in close connection with the life, and then in three chapters suggestively entitled respectively, "The Material World and its Natural Order," "The Human World and Moral Disorder," "God, or the Universal Mind, and Theistic Optimism," the real philosophical argument of the book is independently elaborated.

We may close by calling attention to the two central positions in that argument, to which the author recurs at various stages of it. The one is that the existence of moral disorder is itself the great evidence of moral order at the heart of the universe. "May it not be that the moral disorder now found on this planet signifies, not that we are living in an immorally-constituted universe, but rather that the *present* life of the moral agents who inhabit it is purgatorial; not perfect, but on the way to perfection; through struggle and suffering, and frequent relapse, — consequences of the moral freedom which implies power of moral agents to make themselves bad? . . . The Divine Ideal may be a universe, in this slow way of moral trial and struggle, becoming gradually more and more valuable morally" (pp. 57-9). The other is succinctly stated in the closing sentences of the book. "If Nature is practically trustworthy, and fit to be scientifically reasoned about, the Omnipotent Spirit immanent in it must be perfectly good and design the goodness of all. This is final faith" (p. 84). Both positions will be recognized by readers of the *Philosophy of Theism* as characteristic; in this volume, as in the larger work, we are made to feel the reality of the argument for its author.

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Die Reproduktion und Assoziation von Vorstellungen. Teil I. By ARTHUR WRESCHNER. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1907. — pp. 328.

Some twenty-five years ago Ebbinghaus succeeded in bringing the study of memory under experimental control. Since that time the subject has undergone a profound change. General description has given way to the concrete investigation of a number of lesser problems directed upon the individual factors and conditions of the memorial and associative functions. In this manner there has grown up a technical knowledge of impression, retention, reproduction, recognition, learning by heart, and forgetting, — a large amount of material, now at hand and capable of being used in several different ways. For example, the data now accessible might first of all be gathered together, rearranged and interpreted, and then absorbed into

current systems of psychology. Professor Ebbinghaus himself has incorporated much of the later work in his unfinished *Grundzüge der Psychologie*; and Meumann, in the recent *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die experimentelle Pädagogik, etc.*, has performed a like service for education. In the second place, the material suggests a technical treatment in the form of a *Methodik*; or, again, it might well be made to serve as a guide in a broad investigation which should attempt to cover the general field in a manner quite impossible fifteen or twenty years ago. It is the last of these three ways that Dr. Wreschner has adopted, though he has put his emphasis upon the aspect of reproduction. Certainly the undertaking called for a stout heart. It meant, not a mere repetition of earlier experiments, but a first-hand attack which should combine all the ingenuity and wisdom of fifty men and of a half-score of methods. It meant, if it were to be successful, that every predecessor should be studied and appreciated, and then relegated to foot-notes. Wreschner starts in at the beginning with a Hipp clock, a *Schalltrichter*, and twenty-two observers,—men, women, and children, educated as well as illiterate (besides some 200 persons in his *Massenversuche*),—and he proceeds to take twenty thousand word-reactions. In the investigations reported in Part I, association was unrestricted or 'free,' and the stimulus-word was given but once. The reaction-times are treated by themselves (Quantitative Analysis), and afterward the introspective protocols (Qualitative Analysis). Thus far the author's attention is directed to the associative nexus and its conditions. The stimulus, the reaction-word, and the 'bond' (the relation between the reproducing processes and the reproduced) are considered in their order. The temptation and the danger arising from the use of words,—the tendency, I mean, to fall into logic and into syntax,—Wreschner recognizes; and although he does not entirely escape, his classification of associative forms, that pitfall of the descriptive psychologist, is probably the most nearly adequate that we possess. Like many of his predecessors in the analysis of association, Wreschner lays too much stress on the *Beziehung*, or the associative bond between the releasing word and the word reproduced,—as if a grammatical or logical relation (*e. g.*, attributive or judgmental) were *prima facie* evidence of a ligating process in consciousness. It is true, the author partly saves himself by leaving the bond to introspective control. At the same time, it may well be questioned whether the observer's report that the "cause of the reproduction" (as Wreschner defines association) was, let us say, alliteration ("Zwang-Zwiebach") or synonymy ("Sitte-Gewohnheit") or antithesis ("schnell-langsam"), was a true introspection or a mere reflection lying quite outside the bounds of the associative experience. As the author himself admits, the place for studying incentives to reproduction is the memory-experiment, where associations are made,—not the reproduction-experiment, where they are renewed. The most important classificatory distinction of the monograph is that drawn between *Kombinationen*, in which stimulus and reaction belong to

two successive formations, as "black-white," and *Konnexionen*, a single formation, as "black-cloth." The distinction sets the difference between simultaneous and successive associations in a new light. The author throws out a hint that the two classes may arise from different *Aufgaben* or *Ab-sichten*. And this hint leads the reviewer to observe that *Aufgabe* and *Tendenz* ought as certainly to be taken into account for motives and causes of reproduction as are the overt processes of the associating mind. But Wreschner worked, — it must be noted, — before or beside Ach and Watt and Messer.

Wreschner's reaction-times show the most astonishing uniformities and the most constant and suggestive differences both as regards age, sex, and education, and as regards the nature of the stimulus and of the reaction-word. His liberal use of the arithmetical mean as a representative value is in part offset by frequent rearrangement of data. The monograph abounds in careful analysis and ingenious, though at times suspiciously acute, interpretation. Its completion will be awaited with interest.

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The Stoic Creed. By WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1907. — pp. xxiii, 247.

Professor Davidson has written this work mainly to explain the significance of the Stoic philosophy for the problems of religion and morality. To the Stoics and to the people of their time, the problems of conduct and religion had come to be the chief concern of philosophical speculation. An introductory sketch of the work of Socrates, and of his relation to the Sophists and to the Stoa forms a serviceable preface. Then follows a brief chapter on the historical representatives of the Stoic doctrines in Greece and Rome. In the second and third sections of the work, the whole of the Stoic Philosophy, including Epistemology, Physics, Ethics, and Theology, is discussed.

The discussions show a considerable departure from the traditional mode of treating the history of philosophy. In the first place, the book is written in popular style for a general audience, but at the same time it is on a high plane of scholarship. It is strikingly lucid and every page shows that the writer has diligently pursued and investigated the sources with which the subject deals. Illustrative matter is drawn from a wide range of contemporary literature, and the illustrations enliven and illumine these theories of a remote past. Particularly interesting is the way in which the author first states the content of the Stoic doctrine, and then subjects it to criticism from a purely modern standpoint, thus bringing into clear relief its salient features, sometimes by contrasting it with the Epicurean system, again with the Christian religion, or again with ideas drawn from contemporary philosophical literature. This has the effect of giving vitality and distinctness to the notions discussed. Histories of philosophy are generally content to